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TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW: ARTICULATING
A WOMEN'S RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE
MARY L. LYNDON*
I have in my office a poster from the NGO Forum of the World
Conference, which closed the United Nations Decade for Women, held in
Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985. The design is simple: a black, white, and red
drawing of a strong and graceful African woman. Upon her head she
carries a sign, in place of the traditional pot or basket. The sign reads, "If
it's not appropriate for women, it's not appropriate. Tech and Tools at
Forum 85, Nairobi."
The poster's specific reference is to the Appropriate Technology
movement. Led by women and grassroots activists during the seventies
and eighties, this movement challenged the emphasis on big construction
projects in foreign aid packages.' An "appropriate technology" may be
large or small, crafted or "high tech." The important thing is that it be
accessible to its users and not require them to conform to its demands.
Instead, the technology serves and sustains their chosen way of life.2
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
'See generally UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZA-
TION, BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE: UNESCO'S MEDIUM TERM PLAN 1984-1989 31-33 (1989);
Strategies to Improve the Status of Women Over the Next 15 Years 1985-2000, DESI BACK-
GROUNDER (United Nations Division for Economic and Social Information ed., July 14, 1985);
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AGROFORESTRY, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AGROFORESTRY 14 (1983); Marie Antoinette
Oromen-Myin, The Involvement of Rural Women in Tanzania, 6 CANADIAN WOMAN STUDIES -
LES CAHIERS DE LA FEMME 37-38 (York University Project ed., 1981).
2 For example, one response to deforestation in rural African communities has been to make
home fires more efficient by designing stoves which use less fuel. See, e.g., WOMEN AND
ENERGY PROJECT, WOMEN AND ENERGY IN KENYA (1985) (pamphlet on file with St. John's Law
Review) (describing methods used to teach women to build specifically designed clay stoves in
areas where soil conditions allow easy access to clay); KENGO (pamphlet on file with St. John's
Law Review) (describing organization which produced and distributed ceramic wood stoves
developed by Appropriate Technology Centre at Kenyatta University College, Kenya). An
example of inappropriate technology is the lead-battery production process which was the subject
of a sex-discrimination lawsuit brought by female workers in International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). In this case, the Supreme Court found the
employer's policy barring all women, except those medically demonstrated to be infertile, from
parts of the workplace where lead was pervasive and, therefore, potentially harmful to an unborn
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The vibrant image depicted by my poster also challenges the
deterministic conception of technology, the idea of a "technological
imperative." 3  Two basic deterministic assumptions have profoundly
influenced the law's response to technology: (1) that the pattern of technical
process is preordained, and not the product of human choice; and (2) that
society must adapt its arrangements in response to technological develop-
ments.4 These beliefs are widely held and tend to deflect critical reactions
to new products and obscure opportunities to make technology more
socially responsive.
Today, I want to discuss the status of technology in the law and
suggest that, to secure women's rights to health and a viable environment,
we must re-evaluate and change the law's treatment of technology. I am
going to speak very generally about both medical and reproductive health
technologies and production technologies which affect the environment. I
will discuss conceptual obstacles to changing the law about technology and
suggest that identifying cases in which technology has already been the
subject of women's struggles may help orient us toward articulating legal
rights to appropriate technology.
A threshold difficulty in considering technology is its peculiar
invisibility. The familiar is often invisible and our understanding of
technology suffers from this limitation. Technology is pervasive and it
constitutes the framework for our lives, so we tend not to see individual
technologies as objects nor view technological evolution as a category.
Indeed, we do not have much lay vocabulary for the term "technology."'
fetus to be facially discriminatory, id. at 197-200, and not justified by bona fide occupational
qualifications, id. at 200-06. In her discussion of the issues raised by the case, Patricia Williams
suggests that the practice of Brazilian employers requiring female employees to provide proof of
sterilization has contributed to Brazil having one of the highest rates of sterilization in the world.
See Patricia Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial and
Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV. 81, 86-89 (1991).
3 ANDREW FEENBERG, CRITICAL THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY 122 (1991) ("The dominant view
of modernization is based on the deterministic assumption that technology has its own autonomous
logic of development.").
4 According to Feenberg, determinist theory is predicated on two theses:
1. The pattern of technical progress is fixed, moving along one and the same track in
all societies. Although political, cultural, and other factors may influence the pace of
change, they cannot alter the general line of development, which reflects the
autonomous logic of discovery.
2. Social organization must adapt to technical progress at each stage of development
according to "imperative" requirements of technology. This adaption executes an
underlying technical necessity.
Id. at 122-23.
' See LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CONTROL AS A
THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 8-9 (1977) (arguing that changes to technology's dictionary
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Another problem we face is the fact that our principal theoretical
disciplines have not adequately accounted for technology. The basic
methodologies we rely upon to analyze and understand our situation, such
as neoclassical economics and law, generally fail to incorporate a
description and explanation of technology. The neoclassical perspective
tends to view technology's effects as given, and does not focus on and
examine their source.6 Technology studies have neither been established
as a discipline, nor fully incorporated into the mainstream of other
disciplines. In law, for example, until recently, technology has been the
exclusive concern of intellectual property law, where the emphasis is on
encouraging technical research and development ("R&D"), rather than
evaluating its fruits.7 Environmental law has generally had a pollution-
control orientation based on the model of nuisance law, which focuses on
identifying and reducing damage to air, water, and land.8 Newer legal
approaches to regulation focus on environmental information systems and
attempt to encourage better designs in production processes. For the most
part, such regulatory strategies are still considered novelties. 9
A theoretical stance in law or economics which ignores the way in
which R&D is conducted can lead to several misleading assumptions that
carry through to public policy. If we fail to perceive clearly the way in
which technology evolves, then we cannot determine how to develop
different technological options. What we have tends to appear "right." 0
definition over century reveals "shift in meaning from something relatively precise, limited, and
unimportant to something vague, expansive, and highly significant").
6 See generally DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 10-15 (1990) (discussing components of neoclassical
economic theory and its relationship to technology and environmentalism); RICHARD R. NELSON
& SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 195-205 (1982)
(critiquing neoclassical growth theory as method to explain technical change).
* See generally Mary L. Lyndon, TortLaw and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137 (1995)
[hereinafter Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology].
I See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to
Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1817-20 (1989) (discussing expost method for
setting standards for human exposure to chemicals). Under an ex post method, most environ-
mental controls are applied only "when research establishes both significant exposure to and
toxicity of a chemical." Id. at 1819.
1 See Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L.
REV. 1, 38 (1993) [hereinafter Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation] (discussing waste-reduction
regulation).
10 See generally James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-easy Case for Technological
Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405, 426 (1985) (contending that technological optimism theory is
based "on a package of considerations none of which is sure to materialize"); Nelson and Winter
suggest that the neoclassical perspective tends to miss the way in which past choices obscure other
options. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 6. "The problem with the neoclassical metaphor ... is
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Human needs seem secondary and we are perceived to be dependent on
technical evolution. We expect technology to provide improvements to our
lives and insist that technical research be supported and given free rein.
These are aspects of a stance sometimes labeled "cornucopianism,"" the
belief that technology unfolds in a fated and beneficial fashion and that the
market inevitably will provide the good technologies necessary to
society. 2 In this view, technology is a bounteous source of goods and is
seen as a means of correcting technical dilemmas in which later technologi-
cal development will cure current problems and prove that we have taken
the right path.
Of course, this view is much too optimistic. The work of economists
concerned with innovation debunks this mythology 3 and demonstrates that
the evolution of our existing technologies has been the product of two
factors. The first factor is private investment; R&D choices are made
within market arrangements and are shaped by idiosyncratic commercial
rivalries. " The second factor is government subsidies and procurement,
particularly of military technology. The latter is generally ignored by
not that it connotes purpose and intelligence, but that it also connotes sharp and objective
definition of the range of alternatives confronted and knowledge about their properties. Hence,
it misleadingly suggests an inevitability and correctness in the decisions made.. .. " Id. at 250.
" See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 6, at 13-15. Cornucopianism is one of four basic
world views that the authors outline. Id. at 13. Cornucopianism takes an extreme view of
technocentric environmental economics. Id. It takes a resource-exploitative, growth-oriented
position, and seeks to maximize a nation's gross national product. Id. at 14. Moreover, "it is
taken as axiomatic that unfettered market mechanisms or central planning. . . in conjunction with
technological innovation will ensure infinite substitution possibilities capable of mitigating long-
run physical resource scarcity." Id.
12 See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 6, at 289.
The cornucopian view of technical progress has forecast that rather than adapting
existing natural resources to economic end uses, technological advances may soon
permit the creation of entirely new synthetic materials. . . . It is then suggested that
progress in material science and engineering will supplant resource scarcities as the
ultimate constraint on the rate at which key sectors . . . of the economy can grow.
Id.
, See supra note 10.
See Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, supra note 7, at 143-48.
Private R&D takes place in an idiosyncratic and dynamic setting. The structure of
each market and the characteristics of each technology are unique. Firms selectively
produce and develop knowledge in response to these learning opportunities, reacting
to the behavior of rivals who work on the related projects in a loosely knit group in the
same vicinity of the research terrain.
Id. at 146 (citations omitted); see also Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation, supra note 9, at 10
(indicating that trade-secret doctrine "operates in the context of commercial rivalry for control
of technology and information about it . . . . The law seeks to provide some support for the
integrity of transactions concerning technical information and to encourage its use to develop and
improve technology").
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microeconomic analysis and law and economics, though not by innovation
economics. The existing R&D system has been very productive, but it
also has bypassed many opportunities and created enormous social costs.
Today, two fundamental questions dominate health, safety, and environ-
mental law: (1) how the law should treat the people who have borne the
social costs of technology, whose lives have been disrupted by pollution or
injurious products; and (2) to what extent and in what ways can the law
influence producers of technologies to reduce and prevent these costs. As
we enter a new era of "free trade," the view that private investment
choices should determine the course of technical change is firmly
established. R&D decisions are generally made "privately" and screened
from public participation by property rules. Since nothing is more public
in its effects than is technology, the "privacy" of its origins seems
anomalous.' 5 Government can affect these choices only indirectly through
attempts to structure incentives with taxes and subsidies. While there have
been women inventors" and entrepreneurs who invest in R&D projects,
women, as a group, are largely outside the sphere in which key R&D
decisions are made. They, like government, are limited to trying to
influence these decisions indirectly.
Moreover, because R&D is not only private but also frequently secret,
particular technologies are often developed and marketed before most of
society is aware of them. Once a technology exists, it has value and power
based, in part, on its mere existence, as it may be hard at that point to
change directions. This incumbency also makes the refinement of an
existing technique more likely than the development of new approaches.' 7
Thus, early decisions about which R&D path to pursue will influence the
options exercised by later users or consumers, who had no influence over
the early R&D choices.
Today, technology also develops in the context of human rights law
and this law should have some impact on its course. While women's rights
struggles have redefined basic political rights, economic power remains
unevenly distributed. Large numbers of women throughout the world
continue to be poor and struggling.'" Women lack the power to choose
15 Lyndon, Secrecy andInnovation, supra note 9, at 39-50 (discussing jurisprudential issues
raised by related question of ownership claims to data affecting health of others).
j6 See ETHLIE ANN VARE & GREG PTACEK, MOTHERS OF INVENTION: FROM THE BRA TO
THE BOMB-FORGOTTEN WOMEN AND THEIR UNFORGETTABLE IDEAS (1988).
,7 Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, supra note 7, at 152-53 (discussing path-dependency
of technical knowledge).
18 See Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women are Missing, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Dec. 20, 1990, at 61-66 (discussing neglect of women worldwide).
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and develop technologies, but are, nonetheless, frequently the objects of
these technologies.
The web of existing beliefs and assumptions about technology is laden
with gender issues and ideology. 9 As Judith Wajcman has stated, "the
close affinity between technology and the dominant ideology of masculinity
itself shapes the production and use of particular technologies. "I Familiar
stereotypes, such as "man and machine" or "guy with truck," simply
represent a surface manifestation of complex and shifting dynamics. These
dynamics may include women within technological processes, but often in
disturbing ways." For example, male-dominated pharmaceutical firms
research, develop, and market reproduction technologies, such as Norplant8
contraceptive implants,' for masses of women while large numbers of
women working in the electronics industry produce modern military
systems. Forty percent of the cost of a contemporary naval cruiser is
devoted to its distinctive electronic system. "Thus, an archetypal male
artifact is in reality built in large part by women."'
Can we establish a coherent, legal treatment of technology, including
its development, deployment, and effects, which incorporates human rights
and women's rights principles? Can we develop a way of thinking about
women's right to technologies that are "appropriate" for us? Today, the
law's consideration of technology as a social phenomenon is fractured and
disorganized. While it is true that we have a great deal of law about
technology, it is spread throughout different fields: health law, environ-
mental law, intellectual property law, government programs supporting
research, and military development programs. Technology is not perceived
as the focal point of any of these fields. In these laws, however, there are
opportunities to maximize the capacity of technology to unfold in the
direction of greater responsiveness to human needs. Perhaps we can start
by examining the areas in the law that focus on technology, and, through
19 See generally FEENBERG, supra note 3 (discussing relationship between ideology and
technology).
20 JUDITH WAJCMAN, FEMINISM CONFRONTS TECHNOLOGY x (1991).
21 Id. at 137-59 (examining ideological and cultural influences that create close connection
between men and technology and its impact on women).
' Since its arrival on the American market in 1991, about one million women have used a
NorplantO contraceptive implant. See, e.g., Laura Duncan, Norplant: The Next Mass Tort: State
and Federal Suits Allege Birth ControlDevice is Defective, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 16; see also
ForHigh School Girls, Norplant Debate Hits Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at 1 (discussing
Baltimore's plan to offer NorplantO to teenage girls to reduce pregnancy). As the popularity of
NorplantO implants increases, so does the potential for litigation. Id. (revealing that federal and
state class-action lawsuits have been filed alleging Norplant is defective).
23 WAJCMAN, supra note 20, at 149.
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studying them, develop a coherent set of legal principles about technology's
social dimensions.
Today, feminists are beginning to engage more fully in economic
study and argument.24 This is important; we must not abandon economics
to libertarians who believe that "good" will automatically arise from free
markets. Carol Weisbrod suggests that, because economics asserts the
existence of strategic bargaining chips in different sites, it is able to
articulate the possibilities of countervailing power.' In contrast, lawyers
are accustomed to traditional European hierarchical schemes of politics,
which view women at the low end of a hierarchy. Under the hierarchical
models, relative power is difficult to visualize. 6
We need to visualize this kind of power for ourselves and make room
for it within our legal system. This form of power exists in women's
informal networks, art, writing and publishing, political activism, and
similar endeavors. In the law, plaintiffs, both individuals and classes, and
their attorneys have exercised this kind of power. In toxic tort and
environmental citizens' suits, many women have already been fighting for
the appropriate technology.
Giving greater recognition to their efforts, rather than seeing them
only as victims, is a first step toward a new orientation of technology. For
example, we are beginning to document the history of environmental
activists' resistance to the "technological imperative." Many of these
activists are brave women.' Some of their actions have resulted in
24 See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY
OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
" See Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 985, 999 n.66 (1990).
26 Id. at 999.
' Two environmental activists who come to mind are Lois Gibbs and Hazel Johnson. Lois
Gibbs organized the people of the neighborhoods around Love Canal in Niagara Falls, N.Y., and
fought for recognition of the toxic injuries they suffered. See Michael Slackman. Surprise
Package; Flamboyant Lobbyist to Send Whatchamacallit to VIPs to Make Case, NEWSDAY, Oct.
13, 1995, at A8 (recounting Gibbs' role in Love Canal incident). In 1981, Gibbs founded the
Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, which continues to advise other citizens' groups
about how to rid their own communities of toxic dump sites and other pollution-emitting
industries. See Denise Reaman, Love Canal Activist Warns of Dioxin Danger in L. V.. THE
MORNING CALL (Allentown), Nov. 3, 1995, at B8 (discussing Gibbs' visit to Lebanon Valley,
Penn., to warn citizens of dioxin dangers); Steve Nearman, For All of Love Canal's Craziness,
It Did Launch My Career, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1983, at C3 (interview with Gibbs about her
role as environmentalist activist). Hazel Johnson is the co-founder of People for Community
Recovery, a Chicago citizens' group that is dedicated to addressing and solving local pollution
problems. She and her group organized eight communities from the south side of Chicago and
got the government to close down the numerous landfills located in the communities. See Hazel
Johnson, A Personal Story, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 513 (1994) (discussing her
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lawsuits.' The citizen-suit provisions in environmental laws have lent
support and some degree of effectiveness to these struggles. 29
In tort law, we have a richer, formal record of women's resistance to
harmful technologies.3 ° Plaintiffs range from Judith Sindell, the DES
daughter whose landmark lawsuit led the California Supreme Court to
adopt principles of industry-wide liability for mass injuries, 31 to the many
women whose names and stories now comprise a substantial history of
responses to technological abuses.32
environmental activism at environmental law symposium held at St. John's University School of
Law).
In countless environmental controversies, the community leaders and the foot soldiers of
such struggles have been women. See ENVIRONMENT: A READER-CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sally Sontheimer ed., 1991); VANDANA SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE:
WOMEN. ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT (1989); ANNE WITTE GARLAND, WOMEN ACTIVISTS:
CHALLENGING THE ABUSE OF POWER (1988).
2 See generally Mervak v. City of Niagara Falls. 420 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. 1979)
(identifying Lois Gibbs as claimant against City of Niagara seeking to recover damages for injury
to her and her family caused by Love Canal toxic-waste dump). Gibbs' lawsuit was one of over
900 environmental disaster claims filed against Niagara Falls and New York State as of 1982, id.
at 688; it was her action that spearheaded the movement to get the state and federal government
to clean up Love Canal and relocate the residents who were at risk. See supra note 27. New York
State has spent over $59 million to clean up Love Canal and relocate its residents. Matthew L.
Wald, Out-of-Court Settlement Reached Over Love Canal, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1994. at B1
(reporting that Occidental Petroleum agreed to reimburse New York State for cleanup work at
Love Canal and to take over work). Occidental Petroleum has already paid over $20 million to
1,400 people who claimed injuries as the result of Love Canal, id., and there are still 690 people
with outstanding claims against the California-based corporation. Id.
29 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments ("Clean Water Act"), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
0 See Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575
(1993) (examining tort law through gender power relations, gender bias and discrimination, and
women's experiences); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and The Law
of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990) (providing historical account of law's
treatment of "fright-based" physical injuries and contending that it was women, bringing repeated
lawsuits for damages, who paved way for contemporary tort recognition of emotional damages).
"' See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
32 Listing the names of some of the many women to whom we are indebted seems an
incomplete gesture. Perhaps this history is being compiled elsewhere, as others have recognized
the important synergism of women's rights and the tort system. See, e.g., Pamela Anagnos
Liapakis, Tort Reform Could Leave Women Shortchanged, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1995, at C2
(arguing that Congressional tort-reform laws "represent a grave threat to the health and safety of
women in the United States"). The following list emerges from my own teaching experience:
Mariann Hopkins, of Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994) (resulting
in affirmative ruling on acceptable expert evidence in toxic torts cases, which is important
achievement in light of many courts' reaction to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 320 (1993)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 734 (1995); Jane King, of King v. Collagen
Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.) (acknowledging normative issue of compensation to individuals
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As a regulatory mechanism, one of tort law's strengths is that it works
from the particular story of the plaintiff. In this way, tort law can provide
useful technical information missed by more abstract approaches to law
making, such as regulation.33 It also presents a vivid literature concerned
with personal pain and with the need for careY34 These stories are partial,
and are presented in versions that have been refracted through the
adjudication process, colored by the perspectives of the law clerks and
judges who write the opinions. This process is, in some ways, inherently
misleading and, as Kristen Bumiller has suggested of another category of
cases, may simply reinforce existing stereotypes. Perhaps, however, it
need not do so. Women in torts cases have come forward, in their own
who are particularly sensitive to pharmacuticals), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); Ann C.
O'Brien and her mother, Mary Ann, of O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704 (3rd Cir. 1981)
(producing vivid and seasoned dissent claiming majority imposed on plaintiff "insurmountable
burden of knowledge, inquiry, and insight"); Ellen Braune and her co-plaintiffs, of Braune v.
Abbott Labs., 895 F. Supp 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing feminist scholarship and giving reading
of New York's statute of limitations); Anne Anderson, of Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628
F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) (suing for wrongful death of her son from leukemia allegedly
caused by toxic waste); Janette Allyn Hawkinson and her co-plaintiffs, of Hawkinson v. A.H.
Robbins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984) (revealing corporate negligence and fraud
behind Dalkon Shield); Irene Allen, of Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp 247 (D. Utah)
(advocating thoughtful, ground-breaking theory of cause to enable victims of government nuclear
tests to recover for damages), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004
(1984); Mae and Robert Ayers, of Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987)
(granting damages award for reduced quality of life when town's residents had to use barrels of
water instead of tap water because town wells were contaminated and, in tort breakthrough,
securing substantial award for medical monitoring until health effects of contamination could be
determined); Carol and Clifford Anderson, of Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 557 N.Y.S.2d 981
(App. Div. 1990) (denying husband's claim of loss of consortium from wife's infertility due to
DES effects), aff'd, 588 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 1991).
33 See Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, supra note 7, at 159-65 (providing examples
demonstrating that tort law serves as better way to monitor and guide process of technological
development than regulatory method). See generally Leslie Bender, Feminism (Re)Torts:
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Powers, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848
(providing ways feminist analysis can change laws controlling corporate forms and corporate
decision-making as well as improve flaws in tort system; viewing tort system as result of
corporate irresponsibility rather than litigious plaintiffs).
I See, e.g., Bender, supra note 30; Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 30; Lucinda Finley, A
Break in the Silence: Introducing Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
41, 50-51 (1989) (examining ways in which potential and true dimensions can be better realized
by understanding women's participation in relational and emotional damages and also seeing
relational and emotional damages as substantial).
I Cf. Kristen Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Women in
Legal Culture, 18 INT'L J. Soc. L. 125 (1990) (examining ways in which rape trials and other
sexual crimes actually reinforce dominant preconceptions concerning men, women, and sexual
violence); Kristen Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism,
42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75 (1987) (providing personal observations of rape trial to describe how
legal discourse imposes restraints on interpretation of events surrounding trial).
1995]
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names, and not as part of a public prosecution, and demanded a redress for
their injuries. In some cases, judges incorporate feminist perspectives into
the formal analysis,36 and, in the history of tort law on emotional
damages, we have an example of an area in which women's insistence on
being heard has effected fundamental changes in the law.37
Tort law and environmental citizens' suits are important legal
mechanisms in a society which produces technologies privately and screens
them through a centralized regulatory agency only after they have been
produced. Tort law and citizens' suits bring important information and
perspectives on technology into the law. Yet, we should not feel too
secure about these legal options. Not only are they highly imperfect and
limited in scope, but both have come under serious attack. Tort law is
being assaulted by the "tort reform" movement, which seeks to curtail or
eliminate product liability laws, while environmental legislation pending in
Congress threatens to further handicap efforts to make technical change
socially responsible. We may well lose both legal mechanisms as we move
into a globalized legal framework under NAFTA,38 GATT,39 and related
international schemes. "Tort reform," new environmental legislation, and
the future internationalization of the law must be focal points for working
36 In O'Brien, Judge Higginbotham's dissent argues that the majority depersonalized the
concepts of knowledge and choice. O'Brien, 668 F.2d at 714-21 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority's decision to deny nineteen year-old girl recovery for injuries suffered by
corporation's negligence because she failed to conduct reasonable inquiry into circumstances
surrounding her cancer surgery after she read about similar operation in magazine). In Braune,
Judge Weinstein made the same point. Braune, 895 F. Supp. at 555 (citing CAROL GILLIGAN,
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1992), as authority for proposition that "[tihe law must take into account
the reasonable intellectual and emotional states of people in plaintiffs' particular position"). In
Hawkinson, Judge Matsch rejected the defendant's argument that engaging in sexual intercourse
with several partners, not the defendant's IUD, was the cause of the two plaintiffs' injuries.
Instead, the court saw the plaintiffs' sexuality as the context in which the injuries occurred, noting
that the product was designed to enable freer sexual activity. See Hawkinson, 595 F. Supp. at
1331 (upholding plaintiffs' claims that Dalkon Shield caused severe physical injuries).
3 See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 30.
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (containing
ch. 109), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (containing chs. 10-22). NAFTA is an agreement among the
United States, Canada, and Mexico to expand free trade and improve economic relations among
those nations. See id.
39 General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT has not been ratified as a full treaty by
the United States Senate. Instead, it has been approved as an executive agreement. See JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 34-35 (1989) (discussing Congress' refusal to ratify GATT). In December 1994,
however, a lame-duck United States Congress ratified the Uruguay Round of GATT. See
generally David E. Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs; A Victory for Clinton.
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at A6.
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to preserve and expand the human right, and women's right, to appropriate
technology.

